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The standard platoon - usually thirty or so men including one officer, one senior sergeant and three junior sergeants leading three rifle squads - was the infantryman's family in Vietnam.
His platoon mates were the uncles and cousins and his squad mates were the brothers.
Beyond the platoon - company and battalion - the average solider neither knew nor cared much except as orders from those senior levels affected what he was required to do in the field.
Most rifle platoons were extremely tight and close-knit with every soldier understanding full well how much his survival depended on the performance and reliability of every other soldier in the unit.
As with all families, however, squabbles and disputes happened.
Left untreated or untended by solid leadership, these problems could result in lackluster performance, bad attitudes and aberrational behavior.
Fortunately, such incidents - My Lai is a classical example - were few and far between over the ten years of US involvement in Vietman.
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Contrary to popular military mythology, not all 2nd Lieutenants serving as rifle platoon leaders were fuzzy-cheeked, naïve, incompetent and clueless.
Neither were they gung-ho ticket punchers with substandard tactical skills, willing to sacrifice their men just to please their superiors.
Granted there were platoon leaders who would fit these definitions but the vast majority was caring, competent and willing to learn from the veterans in their platoons regardless of rank.
Young platoon leaders suffered heavy casualties in Vietnam but not because they were incompetent, lost or stupid.
They died or suffered major wounds because they were out front leading and trying to influence the flow of battle.
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| One of the myths I try desperately - and mostly fail miserably - to dispel about fighting men in Vietnam is the impression that we were all stone dopers sucking on opium-laced joints at every break in the field.
It just ain't so, folks.
Ask any Vietnam veteran grunt and he'll be anxious to let you know that we simply couldn't afford - in fact, would not tolerate - people in our units stumbling around out in the bush stoned out of their gourds.
That was an instant, unfailing recipe for death or disaster. In the bush - patrolling, movement-to-contact, counter-ambush drills - you lived or died based on your senses and instincts.
Altering them or dulling them in any fashion got you killed quickly.
That's not to say grunts didn't indulge when they got to the rear areas.
They did, but they cleaned up their act prior to heading back out to the bush and stayed sober while they were out.
Most of the weird and wild dope experiences of Vietnam were had by rear-echelon troops who could afford the experience with no threat of losing their lives in the bargain. |
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